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October 30, 2007 Tutt’e tre stesero la mano verso colui che usciva [dall’osteria] con passo
franco, e con l’aspetto rianimato: nessuno parlò; che poteva dir di più una
preghiera? <<La c’è la Provvidenza!>> disse Renzo; e, cacciata subito la
mano in tasca, la votò di que’ pochi soldi; li mise nella mano che si trovò
più vicina, e riprese la sua strada. La refezione e l’opera buona (giacchè
siam composti d’anima e di corpo) avevano riconfortati e rallegrati tutti i
suoi pensieri.
[A. Manzoni, I promessi sposi, Cap. XVII, 1840-42]
The three beggars stretched out their hands to Renzo, as he left the inn
with a free step and reinvigorated air, but none of them spoke; what more
could language have expressed? <<There’s a God-send for you!>> said
Renzo, as he hastily thrust his hand into his pocket, and, taking out his
last pence, put them into the hand that was nearest to him, and went on
his way. The refreshment, and this good work together (since we are made
of both soul and body), had gladdened and cheered all his thoughts.
[A. Manzoni, I promessi sposi (The bethrothed), Vol. XXI. The Harvard
Classics. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909—14; Bartleby.com, 2001]
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is commonly observed that, while sharing a common orientation toward democracy
and a free market economy, Europe and U.S. diﬀer widely about the role assigned to
the State. One dimension in which diﬀerences are marked is in the numerous taxes,
transfers and regulations that may be grouped under the label “Welfare State”, i.e. all
the public activities devoted to helping and protecting the poor. Recent papers (e.g.
Alesina et al., 2001) have argued that European and U.S. Welfare States diﬀer because
American society is more racially fragmented, and this - in turn - might have shaped
individual beliefs about what determines income. In particular, the authors suggest
that according to data provided by the World Values Survey, U.S. citizens seem to
believe personal income and wealth are mainly driven by individual eﬀort, whereas
Europeans are more prone to the idea that luck determines personal success.
Diﬀerences in attitudes between Europe and the U.S. may emerge also when volun-
teering, giving, and not for proﬁt organisations are taken into account. Comparative
studies are quite rare, due to data constraints, and explanations of the huge variations
across countries are often linked to diﬀerences in government social spending; see e.g.
the macro-structural approach discussed in Salamon and Sokolowski (2001), analysing
diﬀerences in volunteering. Exploring dissimilarities in money giving between U.S. and
U.K., Wright (2002) claims that “philanthropy” (in the U.S.) diﬀer from “charity” (in
the U.K.) with respect to the level of donations, the characteristics of donors, and even
the methods used to donate; in particular, while the overwhelming majority of dona-
tions in the U.S. can be seen as a “planned activity” (with installments to be paid on
a regular time base), giving in U.K. is more spontaneous and based on “spare change”
methods. Once again, these diﬀerences are explained by the author with cultural diver-
sities as for the role of the State and the attitudes toward money and wealth, as well as
by the tax treatment of donations. More speciﬁcally, and according to the role assigned
2to the State, tax incentives for money giving are well established and of signiﬁcant size
in the U.S. tax code since the eighteenth century, while until very recently, no general
tax beneﬁts for donors were available in the U.K., as in other European countries.
Coherently with these stylised facts, a large body of the empirical literature on time
and money donations - mainly based on U.S. data - has been devoted to the estimation
of the tax-price elasticity of money (and time) donations, while much less attention has
been devoted to developing a behavioural model accounting for a full set of individual
choices with respect to the allocation of income and time, more coherent with a “spare
change” approach to giving. In this paper we try to ﬁll this gap. We ﬁrst present
an extended static labour supply framework accounting for both types of donations,
building on e.g. Duncan (1999). Endogenous income can be used for consumption of
private goods or donations to charities, while time can be allocated to labour, volun-
teering, housework and leisure. Next, we test the predictions of the theoretical model
on a cross-section of individuals drawn from a survey (Indagine Multiscopo)r u nb yt h e
Italian National Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT) in 2000. To this end we build a system of
simultaneous equations for limited dependent variables.
This paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we build theoretical
and empirical versions of a model that accounts simultaneously not only for choices
about the two types of giving, but also for choices about other two important activities
- household and market work - that are likely to be intrinsically related with charitable
gifts, because of their impact on available time and income. Second, we investigate
empirical correlations between the individual propensity to donate time and money.
Knowledge of whether time and money donations are correlated has relevant impli-
cations. From a positive point of view, it allows to shed light on the determinants of
individuals’ behaviour into important ﬁelds, where economic factors and social norms,
as well as cultural eﬀects, are intrinsically interconnected, and of which much more
needs to be known. From a normative point of view, a better understanding of the
mechanisms through which people reallocate time and money resources between volun-
tary work and money donations may have important policy implications, e.g. for the
design of an optimal fund-raising or tax-deduction scheme.
Controlling for a set of observable individual characteristics - capturing individual
tastes and economic constraints - as well as for the latent relationship between hours of
work in the market and at home, main results indicate that voluntary work and money
donations are positively related, i.e. a positive shift of time donations brings about a
shift of the same sign in money donations, suggesting that time and money donations
are somewhat complements in the utility function of each subject.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review the literature focus-
ing on time and money donations, from diﬀerent perspectives (i.e. from an economic,
sociological and psychological point of view). The third Section introduces the theoret-
ical framework and discusses some implications for the empirical analysis. Section four
describes the data and some descriptive facts about the relationship between volun-
teering and gifts of money, which are further investigated in Section ﬁve, that presents,
in sequence, the econometric model and the main results. Concluding remarks follow.
32 Literature review
The theoretical and empirical literature has identiﬁed several variables that can aﬀect
the amount of money donations and of time volunteered. In this section we brieﬂy
review the relevant papers, grouping all the works according to the variables they
consider. In particular, we focus on whether they consider individual preferences and
attitudes, charities behaviour, or government behaviour as determinants of donations.
Individual preferences and attitudes. A ﬁrst group of determinants of money and
time donations is represented by people preferences and attitudes. However, identifying
such variables within the utility maximisation framework, and distinguishing between
diﬀerent explanations, is not an easy task. Indeed, in his review Andreoni (2005)
suggests that philanthropy is one of the greatest puzzles for economics, because a
science based on precepts of self-interested behaviour does not easily accommodate a
behaviour of such clearly unselﬁsh sort. How can one reconcile unselﬁsh actions with
self—interest? Andreoni proposes ﬁve answers: a) charitable giving is not unselﬁsh at
all, because giving is directed at buying a certain future service (e.g. donations to
opera houses to obtain new and better performances in the future); b) “enlightened
self-interest” (a sort of “expected” reciprocity) suggests that people donate because
they hope - in the event of being in needs in the future - to receive help from others;
c) altruism, i.e. people care about well-being of others in their local community/social
network (or of society at large), and cooperate to ﬁnance (impure) public goods; d)
“warm-glow”, i.e. people get utility from the act of giving itself; e) moral motivations
and moral codes of conduct, that make economics ill-suited to explain philanthropic
activities. All these variables - even the last one, that represents the “last refuge” for
the economic theorist - have been considered in the literature by including additional
terms to the utility function. For instance, (a), (b) and (d) above can be modelled by
adding the amount of money donations (as e.g. in Smith and Chang, 2002), and the
amount of hours volunteered or the value of time volunteered (as e.g. in Andreoni et al.,
1996). Variable (c) can be included by either considering the individual contribution
to the provision of a (pure) public good (e.g. Duncan, 1999; Andreoni, 2005), or the
“total” utility derived from the contribution of both time and money. The implicit
assumption is that the utility of other people is directly inﬂuenced by the amount of
public good supplied, or by the total amount of charitable giving. Finally, variable (e)
is related to a more rich model of human behaviour, and can be taken into account by
modelling “intrinsic motivation”, as in Benabou and Tirole (2003, 2006), building on
psychological literature.
A great deal of theoretical research has been devoted in the last years by economists
to include psychological factors as explanatory variables of philanthropic activity into
a model of individual behaviour. The idea that psychological factors might play a role
in explaining non-selﬁsh behaviour is well grounded in the empirical literature. For
instance, Lee et al. (1999) study similarities and diﬀerences in time, money and blood
giving by referring to the concept of role-identity. The basic idea is that individuals
have a role-identity as a donor, insofar as they are inserted in a network of social
relationships. They identify several variables that can have an impact on role-identity:
the expectations of others on our behaviour (which determines “social esteem”); the
4presence of a close parent acting as a “model”; the past receipt of help, that can activate
reciprocal behaviour; personal norms of moral obligations. All these variables inﬂuence
individual preferences and attitudes, and impact on the utility people get from their
decisions on how and to what extent donate.
Perhaps the most comprehensive theoretical model of prosocial behaviour is the one
proposed by Benabou and Tirole (2006). They identify three diﬀerent channels through
which people can get utility from donations: intrinsic motivation, self-image, and social
esteem. Intrinsic motivation refers to people being altruistic, i.e. people caring about
the overall level of public good produced by a given organisation. The interest in their
self-image can be interpreted as “warm-glow”. In this way, individuals get satisfaction
from the very act of giving as in Andreoni (1990) and Menchik and Weisbrod (1987).
Social esteem is a more novel concept - at least in the economic literature - since it refers
to people’s concerns for reputation, i.e. to the fact that they care about how the others
perceive them (i.e. whether they consider them as being altruistic or not). In this
framework, donations act as a “signal” and are driven by the desire to appear generous
and to receive social approval (e.g., Harbaug, 1998; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2003).
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2003) show that the informational content of time and
money donation is diﬀerent; in particular, giving time is better than giving money
when signalling is the primary goal. Benabou and Tirole (2006) study how monetary
and non-monetary incentives interact with these three behavioural determinants. They
show that heterogeneity in motivations creates a signal-extraction problem, so that the
use of e.g. monetary incentives aﬀects the signiﬁcance of observed behaviour, and feeds
back on individuals’ concerns for reputation
Charities behaviour. A second group of determinants is represented by charities’
actions. The economic literature has analysed two diﬀerent strategies for increasing
donations, one based on fund-raising expenditures, the other based on publicly re-
porting the amount of past donations. As for the ﬁrst strategy, Khanna and Sandler
(2000) have suggested two countervailing eﬀects of fund-raising expenditures: on the
one hand, they can increase the amount of donations by giving relevant information to
potential donors; on the other hand, individual contributions can decrease the higher
is the fraction of donations spent for fund-raising, as this reduces their “eﬀectiveness”.
The empirical literature generally ﬁnds the ﬁrst eﬀect to dominate the second one (e.g.
Khanna and Sandler, 2000). As for the second strategy, Harbaugh (1998) studies the
optimal reporting scheme for not-for-proﬁts organisations that want to maximise the
volume of collected donations. Benabou and Tirole (2006) suggest that greater public-
ity has a counter eﬀect on pro-social behaviour, since it introduces additional noise in
the “signal”, as donations become suspected of being motivated just by social esteem.
Government behaviour. A third group of determinants of time and money dona-
tions is government behaviour. Governments can inﬂuence individuals by using both
sides of the public budget. On the one hand, a strand of literature has explored the
crowding-out eﬀect of government grants, on the premise that public and private dona-
tions are close substitutes. Khanna and Sandler (2000) have shown that - contrary to
expectations - public grants crowd-in private donations, since they can be considered a
signal of quality for the services produced by not-for-proﬁt organisations. In a similar
5vein, Day and Devlin (1996) ﬁnd a crowding-in eﬀect of government expenditure also
for volunteering. Considering both time and money donations, Simmons and Emanuele
(2004) conclude instead that there exists a crowding-out eﬀect, but its impact is only
minimal. On the other hand, many authors have considered the impact of tax de-
ductibility on money donations, by calculating the elasticity to their tax price. For
instance, Andreoni et al. (1996) have determined that eliminating tax deductibility in
the U.S. would imply a 5.7% loss in donations. Notice however that the point estimates
of this elasticity widely diﬀer across studies: for instance, Randolph (1995) reports a
coeﬃcient of -0.51, while Auten et al. (2002) of -1.26. Moreover, in the almost unique
study based on European data, Khanna and Sandler (2000) do not include tax rates
in their price measure of giving, considering instead fund raising and administration
expenditures. They motivate this choice by the very modest impact of tax deductibility
in the U.K..
While we accept that, especially in the U.S., both government and charities be-
haviour can have a sizeable impact on time and money donations for the presence of
widespread tax incentives, in this paper we follow a “spare change” approach to giv-
ing, and claim that - at least in Europe, as in other countries where tax incentives are
less important - choices are primarily driven by individual preferences and attitudes1.
Coherently, in the next section, we develop a general theoretical framework for under-
standing charitable giving, enriching the standard model of labour supply, and derive
some testable predictions on individual behaviour.
3 Theoretical framework
Our behavioural model extends the static labour supply framework to account for both
time and money donations, and for domestic work. The primary scope of the model is
to derive a set of working implications to be tested in the empirical analysis.
Following Benabou and Tirole (2006) we assume that charitable contributions of
time and money can aﬀect utility through three diﬀerent channels. First, directly
from the very act of giving, i.e. by “warm-glow” private consumption motives as in
Andreoni (1990). Second, indirectly through a “social signal” or the “prestige motive”,
according to which giving is driven by the desire to appear generous and to receive social
approval (e.g. Harbaug, 1998; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2003). Finally, through the
consumption of an (impure) public good produced by a charity using volunteer labour
and money donations from a community of individuals.
Since we focus on a particular form of prosocial behaviour which requires time
(i.e. volunteering), diﬀerently from previous studies we also make explicit account of
the fact that time donation is not the sole relevant alternative to non-market labour.
More speciﬁcally, we keep both hours volunteered and time devoted to domestic work
distinguished from leisure. In particular, we assume that houseworking is used to
1Evidence on this point is available through survey data. See e.g. Wright (2002) for UK, showing
that when individuals are asked on whether they would like to give to charity in order to reduce their
own tax bill, 52% disagreed and only 14% agreed. Similar ﬁndings are observed also for Italy.
6produce services that may have market substitutes (see e.g. Gronau, 1977 for home
production; Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987 for volunteer labour supply).
We proceed as follows. We ﬁrst present a set of results for a simpliﬁed version of
the model, which we label the “baseline model”, assuming that: people do not have
speciﬁc preferences for time versus money donations (i.e. the two forms of giving are
perfect substitutes); the production of the public good depends on the value of overall
donations; what matters for social prestige is the value of individuals’ time and money
contributions. While, taken together, these assumptions impose quite strong restric-
tions on individual and social behaviours, they considerably simplify the analysis and,
more importantly, allow in many cases to derive sharp predictions for the empirical
analysis. Next, we also explore what happens if - for whatever reason - agents do not
perceive time and money donations as perfect substitutes. This is done by assuming
that people, both at the individual and at the social level, may have speciﬁcp r e f e r e n c e s
for volunteering (or for money donations). This allows us to develop a deeper under-
standing of the factors underlying optimal decisions about the two forms of giving,
which is a key issue to be discussed in the empirical analysis.
3.1 The Baseline Model
We assume well-informed and rational individuals who seek to maximise their utility
subject to a time constraint and an (endogenous) budget constraint2.F o r a g e n e r i c
person living in a community populated by J individuals, individual preferences may






where c is the money value of a composite consumption good, tl are hours of leisure,
d is the total value of donations, q is a non-tradeable “reputational good” or “social
esteem”, and G is an (impure) public good produced by a charity. We assume that the
utility function U is continuous, twice diﬀerentiable, and (strictly) quasi-concave. We
further assume that consumption goods can be either purchased on the market (cm)
or produced within the household (ch) using a certain amount of time (th), given the












2In our theoretical framework we do not model explicitly the behaviour of charities, i.e. the demand
side of volunteering and money donations. We assume that not-for-proﬁt organisations are willing to
assume as many volunteers as supplied at the prevailing wage. This implies that we can treat observed
hours of volunteering as coming from optimal supply decisions and not from a mixture of demand and
supply forces. We argue that this simplifying assumption might be plausible if the cost of volunteers
was zero. We also note that, in practice, the behaviour of charities seems to be primarily driven by
the availability of volunteers, so that an excess of supply in volunteering is quite rare. Moreover, as
Duncan (1999) has shown, not-for-proﬁt organisations will never be “constrained”, i.e. receive more
time donations than they actually require. In our (public and private) consumption model we also
abstract from investments motives in time donations as in Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), a point
explored empirically by e.g. Day and Devlin (1998).
3To simplify the notation, we suppress the individual-speciﬁci n d e xi.
7Thus, cm and ch are perfectly substitutable, and housework hours do not provide utility
per se to the individual - as it would be, for example, in the case of childcaring activities
- but only to the extent that they provide a substitute for market goods4. As in Duncan
(1999), we also assume that people care only about the total value of donations:
d = v + m
where v is the value of time giving and m is the amount of money donations (i.e. time
and money donations are perfectly substitutable). The value of volunteering v is given
by the product of hours of giving (lv) and their contribution to the production of the
charity, i.e. the individual productivity of voluntary labour (α):
v = αlv (3)
In other words, if a doctor decides to donate time, it is not indiﬀerent for herself,
for the others and for the charity if he works a certain number of hours for Doctors
Without Borders or, say, for feeding the homeless. In particular, we also assume that
α ≤ w, i.e. that people’s productivity when volunteering can be at best equal to their
productivity in the market. Moreover, according to the literature on volunteering and
money donations, “social esteem” is produced by both the (individual) value of time
volunteered and charitable money contributions:
q = q(v + m) (4)
Finally, individuals derive utility also from the total amount of the (impure) public
good produced by charities using the (total) collected value of time (as labour input)
and money donations (as capital input) in the community5:








Thus, we allow for diﬀerent individuals to provide diﬀerent amounts of inputs in the
production of the charity; notice also that the total labour input V is measured in
eﬃciency terms. Both q and G are assumed to be (strictly) quasi-concave functions6.
The assumption that agents are interested in the total value of altruistic activities,
and not in the way in which they are divided into their money and time components,
makes our setting similar to the one proposed, among others, by Duncan (1999) in his
mixing public-private consumption model of money and time gifts. Diﬀerently from
him, we explicitly recognise that, in addition to “warm-glow” motives, also reputation
mechanisms may be important determinants of donations as a private consumption
good, besides public consumption good.
Individual choices are subject to time and money constraints as follows:
4The extension to the case in which domestic work yields directly utility it is quite straightforward.
See Kooreman and Kaptein (1987) for a model where housework also contribute to leisure.
5Notice that G is not a measure of government expenditures, but of private contributions to the
provision of a public good, that can supplement public provision.
6Under this assumption, given the parameters, a unique cost-minimising solution in the production
o ft h ei m p u r ep u b l i c - g o o de x i s t s .
8tl + th + tv + tn = T (6)
cm + m + w(tl + th + tv)=wT + y (7)
where T is total time available for economic activities (hence net of the amount of time
devoted to commuting), tn are paid working hours, w is the (exogenous) wage rate, y
is the (exogenous) unearned income. The wage rate is individual-speciﬁc, as we claim
that individuals are heterogeneous in both their preferences and their productivity
in the labour market7. Since consumption of market goods and services will not be
explicitly treated in the empirical analysis, for simplicity we also assume that cm is
strictly positive at the optimum. The other choice variables of the individual - labour
supply, hours of domestic work, volunteering, and money donations - can be either
zero or positive at the optimum, depending on preferences and exogenous parameters
(wages, productivity when volunteering, and non labour income)8.
Using the time constraint to express the model in terms of hours of paid work instead
of leisure, and substituting the budget constraint into the utility function for cm,u t i l i t y
maximisation for each individual in the community implicitly deﬁne best response
functions for time uses and money donations. Accounting for strategic interactions
in the provision of the “impure” public good and for the heterogeneity of preferences
across individuals, the i − th person functions may be expressed as follows:
tj∗ = tj∗ (α,w,y,G−i;Zj,ε j) ≥ 0,j = n,h,v; (8)
m∗ = m∗ (α,w,y,G−i;Zm,ε m) ≥ 0 (9)







, i.e. the time and money donations of all the
other individuals in the local community, the Z’s are standard vectors of demographic
factors accounting for heterogeneity of agents’ preferences, and ε’s are individual-
speciﬁc taste shifters, which are unobserved to the researcher and that inﬂuence optimal
decisions9. According to this formulation, the set of observed choice determinants may
not exactly overlap. Unobserved individual eﬀects in (8) are assumed to be speciﬁct o
each equation. However, since some unobserved preference shifters may be important
determinants of each decision rule, errors may be correlated across equations. This is
7For simplicity, we thus assume that the opportunity cost of volunteering, as well as of other non
market activities (leisure and houseworking) is the market wage. Duncan (1999) shows that, in a
model where money and time contributions serve just to provide a public good, the wage equals the
opportunity cost of time: otherwise, the charity would be better hiring someone else to do the job and
the contributor would give only money. See also Brown and Lankford (1992) for a discussion over this
issue.
8Corner solutions implicily deﬁne a set of reservation wages (or reservation prices in the case of
money donations) - one for each constrained choice variable - that replace market wages and depend
on preferences. An explicit allowance for corner solutions will be made in the empirical analysis.
9Variation in demographic characteristics and unobserved factors is aimed at capturing diﬀerential
preferences in dimensions likely to aﬀect supply decisions, whereby individuals with certain charac-
teristics and preferences select diﬀerent combinations of paid work, domestic work, donations and
volunteering.
9an important issue which will be directly addressed in the empirical analysis.
Details on the derivation of optimality conditions are given in Appendix 1. We ﬁnd
that, given the perfect substitutability between home-produced and purchased services,
in equilibrium agents work at home to the extent that their marginal productivity of
an hour of this type of work is higher than an hour’s market wage: ∂f(th)/∂th >w ;
otherwise they are better oﬀ by earning labour income to purchase goods and services
in the market10. As in the standard labour supply model, paid work decisions are
driven by the comparison of total marginal costs (in terms of leisure reduction) and
beneﬁts (the value of goods consumption): denoting Uk the ﬁrst derivative of the utility
function with respect to the generic k−th argument, for individuals oﬀering a positive
amount of hours we have Utl = wUc;o t h e r w i s eUtl >w U c and time for paid work is
zero.
As for donations, our results are similar to Duncan (1999), except for the fact that
here we explicitly account for an additional rationale to donate (i.e. signalling altruism
to receive social approval). As shown in the appendix, FOCs for time and money
donations take the following form:
[tv]: α(Ud + Uq + UG) ≤ Utl (10)
[m]: w(Ud + Uq + UG) ≤ wUc (11)
where the LHS is the value of the marginal utility for both types’ donations. Equality
holds whenever tv and m are positive. Given the perfect substitutability between
volunteering and money gifts, it is relatively straightforward to show that only three
types of strategies can be optimal, deﬁning Nash equilibria. First, if conditions are not
binding, individuals do not contribute at all (tv =0 ;m =0 ). Second, individuals donate
money but do not volunteer; this occurs when volunteering is either less productive
than paid work (α<w ), therefore less attractive than money gifts, or as productive as
working (α = w) but when optimal hours of work are zero. Finally, when α = w the two
FOCs collapse into a single equation which deﬁnes only the total value of contributions
d, so that any combination of time and money giving which amounts to that value is
optimal. However, if α ≤ w there are no equilibria with positive volunteering and zero
money donations. The intuition behind this result is that optimal choices of m and
tv a r ed r i v e no n l yb ye ﬃciency considerations: since individuals do not have speciﬁc
tastes for one charitable activity against the other, preferences play a little role, and
decisions are purely a matter of comparing opportunity costs.
3.2 Extending the Baseline Model
The modelling approach discussed so far neglects at least two important aspects. First,
coeteris paribus,s o m ep e o p l em a yn o tb et o t a l l yi n d i ﬀerent between “warm-glow” de-
rived from volunteering and money donations. In particular, a direct involvement in
the provision of services by a not-for-proﬁt organisation, through the supply of unpaid
work may deliver per se more utility than the simple oﬀering of a money gift. Second,
as discussed in the previous section, there are several reasons why signalling altruism
10However, if an individual prefers consuming self-produced goods and services (think e.g. to care-
giving), she may work at home even if her productivity at home is lower than in the market.
10through voluntary work or money does make a diﬀerence for individuals’ reputation:
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2003) suggest that “time is not money”, in the sense that
gifts of time are valued more than gifts of money because they are able to signal more
altruism. Similarly, Lee et al. (1999) argue that voluntary work is more aﬀected by
others’ expectations than gifts of money. In a slightly diﬀerent setting, Prendergast
and Stole (2001) show that in many circumstances non monetary gifts - such as time
gifts - are oﬀered by a donor instead of more eﬃcient cash transfers because the latter
are seen as impersonal and carrying a “stigma eﬀect” for reputation. Indeed, in equi-
librium the signalling power of time gifts arise exactly because, in principle, they are
ineﬃcient relative to cash.
In the light of our framework, preferences for time donations versus cash transfers
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(12)
where for simplicity we have retained the assumption that what matters for the pro-
vision of the public good is the total value of the endowment available to charities.
However, this extended model allows for the two giving activities being diﬀerent goods,
at least from the two perspectives of warm-glow and reputation building. In particular,
we assume that for some people volunteering may matter more than money donations
for warm-glow (Uv >U m) and/or reputation (∂q/∂v > ∂q/∂m)11.
Quite intuitively, the result is that agents with preferences for volunteering (or for
whom donating time is more eﬀective in the production of social esteem) may now
ﬁnd optimal to volunteer even if the opportunity cost of time is higher than the value
of money contributions. In the Appendix 1, it is shown that this happens whenever
voluntary work possesses a larger utility pay oﬀ in terms of intrinsic preferences and/or
signaling motives than the diﬀerence in opportunity costs between paid and unpaid
work. However, having a strict preference for volunteering does not necessarily inval-
idate the qualitative results obtained in the perfect substitutability case, i.e. it does
not necessarily imply a positive supply of voluntary labour. For example, suppose that
the utility premium from volunteering is positive but small in absolute value. Then,
the fact that its associated opportunity cost is higher than its productive contribution
would be enough to prevent people from donating time.
In the remaining part of the section we discuss the implications of the models in
terms of individuals’ behaviour, both within the benchmark and the extended model.
This will allow us to derive useful insights for the empirical analysis.
3.3 Implications
According to the baseline model, if individuals are less productive in volunteering than
in the labour market, then the conditional probability Pr(m∗ > 0|tv∗ > 0) should be
equal to 1, while Pr(tv∗ > 0|m∗ =0 )should be zero (e.g., Andreoni et al., 1996). The
same result emerges also in the unrestricted model, whenever for all agents the utility
11Of course, one can also observe that for some individuals money donations would be preferred
to time donations. However, this will strengthen the results obtained with the “baseline model”. In
particular, it can be easily shown that only money donations would be observed in equilibrium.
11pay oﬀ of volunteering is lower than its opportunity cost.
More in general, some agents may have speciﬁc tastes for volunteering, as in the
extended model, and ﬁnd proﬁtable to depart from the optimal behaviour implied by
the baseline model, e.g. by supplying hours of voluntary labour despite α<w .S t i l l ,
whenever the largest share possesses a productivity in volunteering which is much lower
than market productivity, the number of departing individuals may be negligible. This
implies that the conditional probability Pr(tv∗ > 0|m∗ > 0) should be larger than
Pr(tv∗ > 0|m∗ =0 ) . The opposite happens when the diﬀerence between α and w is
small: in this case, even a weak preference for volunteering may be enough to increase
the supply of time donated.
In addition, if the value that people attaches to social esteem is large, we might
expect higher overall donations, as a consequence of reputation mechanisms. We may
thus think that social esteem drives choices when the expectations of others are impor-
tant, e.g. when the person is part of a social network. Moreover, if time matters more
than money in the production of reputation, we also expect a higher impact of social
networks on the probability of volunteering than of cash donations. In the light of our
theoretical model, the net impact of reputation mechanisms on charitable contributions
can be analysed by explicitly including measures of the importance of social networks
in the vector of observed characteristics Z.
These predictions can be summarised in the following two main working hypothesis
for the empirical analysis, following from Propositions (1) and (3) in Appendix 1.
Assuming that Pr(α<w ) > Pr(α = w), then:
• Hypothesis 1: If some people have speciﬁc preferences for volunteering for both
warm-glow or reputation mechanisms, but for the largest fraction: (i) volunteer-
ing is valued more than money donations, but only to a small extent; and/or
(ii) the opportunity cost of volunteering is much higher than its contribution to
charities, we expect that:
Pr(m∗ > 0) > Pr(tv∗ > 0)
Pr(tv∗ > 0|m∗ > 0) > Pr(tv∗ > 0|m∗ =0 )
Pr(m∗ > 0|tv∗ > 0) > Pr(m∗ > 0|tv∗ =0 )
i.e. that the probability of volunteering is higher among those who also give money12.
Thus, if only the total value of gifts matters and money and time donations are perfect
substitutes, optimality conditions are determined by eﬃciency considerations. But if
we assume that the two types of giving are diﬀerent goods, individuals heterogeneity
in preferences plays a key role.
• Hypothesis 2: If agents care about the others and/or they belong to a social
network, so that social esteem is an important determinant of satisfaction, the
12Under the hypothesis of perfect substituability of time and money donations for all individuals, the
corresponding last two conditions would appear as follows: Pr(m
∗ > 0|t
v∗ > 0) = 1; Pr(t
v∗ > 0|m
∗ =
0) = 0 and Pr(m
∗ > 0|t
n∗ =0 )> 0; Pr(t
v∗ > 0|t
n∗ =0 )=0 .
12probability to optimally choose a positive amount of donations is higher because
of the reputation rationale:
Pr(m∗ > 0|network_yes) > Pr(m∗ > 0|network_no)
Pr(tv∗ > 0|network_yes) > Pr(tv∗ > 0|network_no)
Moreover, since time matters more than money, we also expect that13:
Pr(tv∗ > 0|network_yes) > Pr(m∗ > 0|network_yes)
Besides predictions about charitable activities, our behavioural model gives sev-
eral additional insights concerning, for example, the relationship between market and
domestic work. For example, under the assumption that productivity at home is
lower than productivity (or, more precisely, wages) in the market, we also expect that
Pr(th∗ =0 |tn∗ =0 )=0and Pr(th∗ =0 |tn∗ > 0) = 1. More in general, even if produc-
tivity in domestic work is lower than its opportunity cost, an individual may decide to
work at home but not in the market if she prefers home produced goods and services
with respect to those purchased on the market.
The remaining part of the paper contains the empirical analysis, which has the
primary scope to ascertain to what extent the results implied by the theory ﬁtt h e
data. To this purpose, the next section contains an introductory descriptive analysis,
which will be integrated and completed by the econometric investigation in Section 5.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this paper originate from the 2000 wave of the Indagine Multiscopo,
a cross-sectional survey yearly administered by the National Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT)
to a representative sample of the Italian population. The survey is designed to provide
micro-level information on several aspects of everyday life, from dwelling conditions,
to education, health status, labour market behaviour, and time use. Each year, a
sample of nearly 20,000 households (about 60,000 individuals) is interviewed. Detailed
information on the sampling frame and other aspects of the Survey may be found in
ISTAT (2001). For the purposes of the present paper, the estimation sample has been
restricted to household heads and spouses aged 25-60 if men and 25-55 if women. The
resulting sample includes 11,331 men and 11,038 women, with an employment rate of
85% and 54% respectively. On the other hand, 39% of the sample of women report
being a housewife.
The survey enables identiﬁcation of individual time and money donations thanks
to speciﬁc items of the questionnaire. On the money donations front, individuals are
asked whether they have given any money to associations or charities over the 12 months
13We stress that these probability shifts should not be interpreted as causal eﬀects. While in our
model we have treated the production of reputation (and the size of the community to which each indi-
vidual belongs) as an exogenous mechanism, in practice the social network may be partly endogenously
determined. For example, it may be that individuals more altruistic are more likely to enlarge their
network and, at the same time, to be more concerned about social esteem. For this reason, particular
care should be used in the empirical evaluation of these eﬀects.
13Table 1: Sample probabilities of time and money donation
Probabilities Women Men
Pr(tv∗ > 0) 9.95 12.88
Pr(m∗ > 0) 19.30 21.71
Pr(m∗ > 0,t v∗ > 0) 5.70 7.78
Pr(m∗ =0 ,t v∗ =0 ) 7 6 .45 73.20
Pr(m∗ > 0,t v∗ =0 ) 1 3 .61 13.92
Pr(m∗ =0 ,t v∗ > 0) 4.25 5.10
Pr(m∗ > 0|tv∗ =0 ) 1 5 .11 15.98
Pr(m∗ > 0|tv∗ > 0) 57.29 60.42
Pr(tv∗ > 0|m∗ =0 ) 5 .26 6.51
Pr(tv∗ > 0|m∗ > 0) 29.52 35.85
prior to the interview. The survey contains a separate question on whether interviewees
gave money to political parties, and we do not count these as cases of money donations.
As for time donations, the survey asks individuals if (over the last 12 months) they
work without being paid for volunteering associations, non-volunteering associations,
political parties or trade unions, and we exclude the two latter possibilities from our
deﬁnition of volunteering14. Our deﬁnitions are grounded in the literature and are
aimed at isolating charitable behaviour from donations that are more likely to bring
some indirect monetary reward to the individual, e.g. by “investing” in representation.
In each case, we are only able to observe whether donations took place, but not the
amounts contributed or the hours volunteered.
The survey also reports detailed information on aspects of the individual use of
time and - as we have discussed in the theoretical section - such information plays a
crucial role in characterising donations, as long as individuals decide whether or not to
donate while managing also other dimensions of their life, namely time in the labour
market and time at home. Both variables are recorded in the ISTAT survey in terms
of (average) weekly hours of market and domestic work, separately. In particular, the
latter includes both houseworking and caregiving activities.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on time and money donations in our
sample, separately for men and women. Money donations are more frequent than time
donations, and men donate more than women do. By looking at the two outcomes
in conjunction, the Table indicates that the vast majority of either sub-sample does
not donate, whereas some 13 percent chooses to donate money but not time. Looking
at conditional frequencies suggests that donations on the two fronts are somewhat
positively associated: the incidence of money donations rises by approximately four
times if one compares individuals who do not donate time with those who do, and
the increase in time donations is nearly six-fold contrasting non-donors with donors of
money.
The selection of independent variables for the econometric model has been based
14We also experimented using a restrictive deﬁnition of volunteering (i.e. for volunteering associations
only) and found results to be robust to the change of deﬁnition. Throughout the paper, we refer to
results obtained using the enlarged deﬁnition of volunteering only.
14on the economic framework developed in the previous Section, as well as on existing
research and data availability. In particular, we assume that observed outcomes of
optimally behaving agents reﬂect both individual characteristics aﬀecting preferences
and economic constraints, as well as variables for the work status. A description of
the regressors used in the empirical analysis and summary statistics are presented in
Appendix Table A.1. The meaning of regressors’ labels is in most cases self-evident.
5 Econometric Model
The evidence presented in Table 1 may not be fully informative about the correlations
between time and money donations because of compositional eﬀects that plague de-
scriptive statistics. A fuller understanding of these relationship requires a multivariate
analysis. This section presents the simultaneous equations model that we use to inves-
tigate the four processes of interest discussed in the previous Section: money donations
(m), volunteering (tv), (log of) hours of market work (tn), (log of) hours of domestic
work (th). Since, as discussed in the Section 4, we have information on the continuous
variable in the last two cases, but only on the (discrete) decision whether to donate
time and/or money, the model consists of two probit and two tobit equations, and we
allow for free cross-processes correlations in the unobservables.
The four latent outcomes for individual i are:
tj∗ = Xjβj + εj,j = n,h,v
m∗ = Xmβm + εm (13)
ε =( εn,ε h,ε v,ε m) ∼ MVN(0,Ω)
where the vector of errors ε is assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution
(MVN) of dimension 4 with covariance matrix Ω. Equations in (13) are linear speciﬁ-
cations of the demand functions in (8), where the X’s vectors contain both individual
characteristics and proxies for labour and non labour income, which are not observed
in the data. In particular, we included variables accounting for age, education, house-
hold size, marital status, living areas (distinguishing both geographical location and
city size), health, employment status of the partner - in order to account for the role
of the household in inﬂuencing individual choices -, holding of health/life insurances -
to capture individual attitudes toward risk. We further account for the inﬂuences of
economic conditions by including variables related to the individual’s judgement about
the adequateness of household economic resources and the occurrence of diﬃculties in
purchasing necessary items. Finally, we included indicators for whether the individ-
ual reports having friends and/or participating to religious celebrations. In the light
of our theory, the former is aimed at capturing whether the individual belongs to a
social network, which, in turn, should aﬀect the concern to signal altruism because of
prestige motivations and social pressure; besides signalling motives, the latter should
also measure the degree of altruism and “warm-glow” motivations. Thus, we expect
these variables to be negatively correlated with donations, and, to the extent to which
volunteering is more valued than money gift, a stronger association with the former.
All the remaining variables aﬀecting individual choices are included in the unobservable
15terms ε’s.
The mapping between latent propensities and observed behaviour is as follows. For
processes tv and m (volunteering and money donations) we only know whether the
action took place, a 0 − 1 variable. Therefore, we observe
Dv = I(tv∗ > 0); Dm = I(m∗ > 0)
where I(·) is an indicator function which takes value 1 whenever its argument is true,
and zero otherwise. In the remaining two processes we observe continuous hours of
work (either in the market and at home) but with a mass point at zero. According to
the labour supply model developed in the previous section, we can interpret those mass
points as corner solutions in a welfare maximisation problem in which the unconstrained
optimum would be negative. Therefore the observational rule is the following:





where H stands for (log of) observed working hours. The above implies that the ﬁrst
two variances in Ω must be normalised to 1. The remaining coeﬃcients in Ω are free.
A detailed description of the likelihood function for the model is in Appendix 2. Taken
together, the relationships above describe a system of seemingly unrelated regression
equations for limited dependent variables, two probits and two tobits.
6 Empirical Results
Since factors and tastes underlying time allocation decisions typically have a strong
gender component, the analysis is conducted separately for men and women. The com-
plete set of estimates of our four equation model is reported in Appendix 3. Overall, our
ﬁndings are consistent with the existing evidence (e.g. Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987;
Brown and Lankford, 1992; Freeman, 1997). Key observable characteristics have simi-
lar eﬀects on the two types of giving and across genders, see probit results in Table A.2
col. Eq. 1 and Eq. 2. The probability of positive charitable gifts is generally increasing
in schooling and age (with a concave proﬁle) for both men and women. Moreover,
people from northern regions are more likely to donate (and especially to volunteer)
than people from the South, a result fairly common in Italy where large diﬀerences
exist in the level of income as well as in the presence of not-for-proﬁt organisations
across regions. Also living in urban areas is positively associated with giving, but there
is a U-shaped relationship between both volunteering and money donations, and the
size of the area15. Interestingly, holding a life/health insurance have a positive impact
on giving, probably capturing an income eﬀect as well as the individual propensity to-
ward risks16. The negative coeﬃcients associated with “time commuting” variables in
the gender-speciﬁc volunteering equations reveal the importance of the time constraint
15Notice that, in our framework, the geographical variables included in regressions pick up also the
eﬀect of local not-for-proﬁt and government behaviour, as well as of G−i in Eq. (8).
16Notice that individual propensity toward risks can be associated to individual beliefs about what
determines income. If one thinks luck is an important determinant of income, then she will be more
likely to pay for an insurance, and - coeteris paribus - to donate more.
16on individual decisions17. On the other hand, time spent travelling to the job place
is negatively related to money donations (but signiﬁcant only for men), probably be-
cause commuting time proportionally reduces income available for consumption goods.
Judging to have adequate economic resources (one of our measures of the ﬁnancial and
economic situation of the households) matters for money donations, coeﬃcients taking
the expected sign for both men and women. Moreover, only for the former, we also ﬁnd
a positive impact of an adequate economic situation on volunteering, a point hinting
at possible gender diﬀerences in the pattern of donations.
Unsurprisingly, individuals living in poor families (i.e. where there are problems in
purchasing subsistence goods, such as food and health care) donate less than the others.
On the contrary, a similar pattern does not emerge for the supply of voluntary labour,
which seems to be less aﬀected by economic contingencies, and driven more by intrinsic
motivations: even if it would have a positive money payoﬀ, in bad times agents are on
average not willing to substitute hours of unpaid volunteering with market activities.
About other individual characteristics, results are less clear-cut: having a partner is
overall negatively related to donations only for women. Moreover, while there exists a
U-shaped relationship between the number of children and volunteering for men, the
same pattern does not emerge for women; in particular, the impact is negative but
almost never statistically signiﬁcant at the usual levels of conﬁdence. These ambiguous
ﬁndings probably depend on two forces working in opposite directions: on the one
hand, having more children reduces available time and income; on the other hand,
people more altruistic (i.e. that are likely to donate more) may have preferences for
having more children.18
As for the employment status of the partner, a variable accounting for choices at
the household level, results show clear gender diﬀerences. Having a spouse employed
signiﬁcantly increases the probability of money donations for men, while - all else equal
-a ne m p l o y e dp a r t n e rh a san e g a t i v ee ﬀect (only marginally statistically insigniﬁcant)
on the probability of volunteering for women. The coeﬃcients on the two variables
intended to capture individual motivations and tastes in the provision of voluntary
work and money donations are signiﬁcant and with the expected sign: in particular,
the lack of friends is associated with lower incentives to contribute, and the eﬀect
is stronger for volunteering than for money donations. Thus, reputational concerns
seem to matter in the provision of charitable contributions: coeteris paribus,ap e r s o n
tied to a social network has a higher probability to volunteer and give money, giving
support to our previous Hypothesis 2. However, it is hard to think at this eﬀect as
causal, as those who are intrinsically less motivated in giving (either for altruistic or
egoistic motivations) may have also been less likely to develop (or to be concerned
about) social interactions. Moreover, similar results holds for the variable capturing
religious participation. While we are not able to disentangle the single contribution of
d, q and G,t h e s eﬁndings suggest that their overall contribution is not negligible19.
17Not surprisingly, time spent commuting has a negative impact also on the other alternative uses
of time, i.e. paid and domestic work.
18Similar results, but for the number of children, are not novel in the literature: see e.g. Vaillancourt
(1994) and Carlin (2001).
19Using a unique dataset combining experimental measures of altruism, survey measures of other
17Table 2: Cross equation errors covariances
Women Men
Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat
Cov(εm,ε tv)0 .523 25.02 0.556 30.28
Cov(εtn,ε tv) −0.009 −0.75 −0.039 −2.14
Cov(εth,ε tv)0 .017 1.42 0.041 1.48
Cov(εtn,ε m) −0.050 −0.97 −0.007 −0.35
Cov(εth,ε m)0 .012 0.70 0.328 4.89
Cov(εtn,ε th) −0.096 −9.67 −0.671 −15.75
Va r(εtn)1 .511 21.74 1.095 23.25
Va r(εth)0 .419 35.61 10.710 31.82
Note: εm,ε tv,ε tn,ε th are the error terms in the
money donations, volunteering, paid labour
and household labour equations, respectively.
Interestingly, for both men and women, while social networks’ ties are always more
important than religious participation in the case of volunteering, the diﬀerence between
the two coeﬃcients is not statistically signiﬁcant in the case of money donations20.O n e
possible interpretation hinges upon the “moral obligation” discussed in Freeman (1997),
i.e. that individuals feel more obliged to volunteer than to give money when asked.
Finally, we brieﬂy comment tobit results in Appendix Table A.2 col. Eq. 3 and
Eq. 4 for domestic and market working hours. First, for standard controls in labour
supply equations (e.g. education, age, regions, ...) results are unsurprising and in line
with previous studies. In addition, we report a negative sign for dummies aimed at
capturing diﬃculties in purchasing necessary goods, but in this case there is a clear
reverse causality problem. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that as the number of children in the
household increases, men optimally react by working more, while women reallocate
more time to child care and domestic work. This is consistent with our behavioral
predictions, i.e. that there is a negative correlation between working at home and in
the market. Accordingly, agents allocate time to the one or the other activity depending
on the existence of a comparative advantage, with women being more productive at
home (or being more discriminated at work) than men. Gender diﬀerences emerge also
considering the employment status of the partner. On the one hand, having a spouse
employed signiﬁcantly increases the number of both hours of paid work and of domestic
work for men. On the other hand, an employed partner has a positive impact on the
number of hours of domestic work for women, while the negative eﬀect on the number
of hours of paid work is only marginally statistically signiﬁcant.
In order to investigate the inter-relationships between time and money donations,
Table 2 reports the whole set of cross-equations errors’ covariances, separately for men
factors (like reputational concerns), and the number of hours volunteered by volunteer ﬁreﬁghters,
Carpenter and Myers (2007) move in the direction of disentagling these three possible determinants of
donations. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of altruism and reputational concerns.
20This results is based on testing the equality of the two coeﬃcients on no_friends and no_church
separately in the equations for volunteering and money donations. The p-values for the LR tests statis-
tics are the following: LR(men, volunteering) Pr(χ(1))=0.021; LR(men, money don.) Pr(χ(1))=0.231;
LR(women, volunteering) Pr(χ(1))=0.108; LR(women, money don.) Pr(χ(1))=0.662.
18and women21. First, we notice that time and money donations appear strongly and
positively correlated: an upward shift in the supply of volunteering is on average asso-
ciated with an increase in money donations. This evidence suggests that, at least from
the point view of unobserved attitudes, the two types of giving do not “compete” with
each other, but - on the contrary - they appear activities which are undertaken in quite
strong conjunction. We also notice that the correlation has a similar magnitude for
both men and women, and is quite close to estimates by Brown and Lankford (1992)22.
Second, other covariances are statistically signiﬁcant. In particular, we observe a neg-
ative association between domestic and paid work, greater in magnitude for men than
women23.
The variance in hours of domestic work for the men sub-sample is more than 20
times greater than that characterising the women sub-sample, while variances are very
close in the case of market work. Results also show a positive (somehow statistically
weak) association between houseworking and volunteering, again for both genders. By
converse, results for other covariances seem to diﬀer between the two sub-samples;
moreover, covariances are signiﬁcant only for men. In particular, for this sub-sample,
we ﬁnd a negative association between market work and volunteering, and a positive
correlation between hours of domestic work and money donations. To justify our simul-
taneous equation approach we also run a formal test aimed at capturing the separability
between the unobservable determinants of giving decisions and the set of other time
uses (domestic and market work). Results are reported in the last rows of Appendix
Table A.2. Quite interestingly, strong gender diﬀerences emerge: the two set of pro-
cesses are not separable for men, while they are for women. Overall, the whole set of
estimated covariances suggests that the budget constraint is more important for men,
while the time constraint matters more for women. In other words, men seems to al-
locate their time uses considering only two opportunities, both paid and unpaid work,
and leisure (the item excluded here), but do not adjust across diﬀerent types of work
(whether paid or unpaid). On the contrary, women’s choices distinguish between leisure
and work, as well as within the two dimensions of work (paid and unpaid, domestic
and voluntary labour). Our results then conﬁrm systematic diﬀerences by sex found in
the previous literature (e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001), with men more likely to
react to changes in the “opportunity costs” of giving than women.
Estimations’ results can also be used to predict joint and conditional probabilities
of money and time donations. Predictions for an individual endowed with mean charac-
teristics are reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 3. By ﬁxing personal attributes, such
an exercise allows dealing with the compositional eﬀects that blur descriptive statistics.
We ﬁnd that, for both men and women, the probability to volunteer is positive, but
lower than the probability to donate money. As regards joint densities, obtained con-
21As we normalised variances to 1 in the probit equations, for time and money donations the estimated
covariances coincide with correlation coeﬃcients.
22These observations strengthen our results. However, covariances between unobservables pick up
all the determinants we were not able to control for in our model, hence their sign can be inﬂuenced by
am i s s p e c i ﬁed model. An example of omitted variable that could induce a positive covariance between
time and money donations is the productivity parameter α.
23About the latter result, also Kalenkosky et al. (2005) report a negative correlations between market
hours of work and housework, although their analysis is restricted to childcaring activities.
19Table 3: Predicted probabilities: Base and stylised individuals
Base individ Base&No motiv Base&Fin. diﬀ Base&Risk av
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probabilities women men women men women men women men
Pr(t
v∗> 0) 8.54 11.28 3.25 4.37 6.89 11.45 12.95 14.35
Pr(m
∗> 0) 16.20 24.76 10.98 17.28 8.44 16.56 25.99 34.11
Pr(m
∗> 0,t v∗> 0) 4.13 7.15 1.53 2.74 2.31 5.70 7.66 10.31
Pr(m
∗=0 ,t v∗=0 ) 7 9 .39 71.09 87.29 81.08 86.97 77.68 68.71 61.84
Pr(m
∗> 0,t v∗=0 ) 1 2 .06 17.61 9.44 14.54 6.13 10.85 18.32 23.80
Pr(m
∗=0 ,t v∗> 0) 4.40 4.13 1.72 1.63 4.58 5.74 5.29 4.03
Pr(m
∗> 0|t
v∗=0 ) 1 3 .19 19.85 9.76 15.21 6.58 12.26 21.05 27.79
Pr(m
∗> 0|t
v∗> 0) 48.44 63.35 47.15 62.67 33.51 49.82 59.14 71.87
Pr(t
v∗> 0|m
∗=0 ) 5 .25 5.49 1.93 1.97 5.00 6.88 7.15 6.12
Pr(t
v∗> 0|m
∗> 0) 25.53 28.87 13.99 15.86 27.36 34.44 29.48 30.23
Base individual: individual endowed with sample mean characteristics.
Base & No motivat.: base individual + no motivations (has not friends,does not go to church).
Base & Financial diﬃc.: base individual + ﬁnancial diﬃculties (ﬁve items of diﬃcult purchasing).
Base & Risk aversion: base individual + risk aversion (has health and life insurance).
trolling for the correlation between unobserved determinants of both giving processes,
it seems that - among the various potential combinations - the one in which people do
not give at all is by far the most likely. Interestingly, while the joint likelihood of giving
both time and money is less than 10%, there is a probability of around 15% of money
donations and no volunteering. Moreover, although small, there is a share of people
who are expected to contribute with only time donations. Moving to conditional prob-
abilities, we notice that, consistently with our theoretical predictions, donating money
is positively associated with the probability of volunteering.
In order to gauge the associations between personal attributes and outcomes, Table
3 also presents predicted probabilities for diﬀerent stylised individuals, who are sim-
ilar to the one endowed with mean characteristics, except for some relevant aspects.
Column (2) shows that if we remove participation to religious celebrations and having
friends (our proxies for both warm glow and prestige motivations), marginal proba-
bilities of donations sharply decrease (-61% for volunteering; -32% for money gifts).
A similar pattern emerges for both joint and conditional probabilities. This gives a
quantitative measure of the importance of motivations to explain giving behaviours.
In column (3) we experiment how giving is aﬀected by the economic situation and the
economic constraint. In this case, the diﬀerence between the base and the individual
in ﬁnancial diﬃculties is given by the fact that for the former it is diﬃcult to purchase
a number of necessary goods. Results show that, while the probability of volunteering
decreases to a small amount, there is a sharp drop in that of giving money, and, more-
over, in the likelihood to contribute with both time and money. In other words, the
economic situation of the household matters for individual giving decisions, more for
money than for time donations. Finally, we also investigate how charitable behaviours
are inﬂuenced by preferences toward risk. According to Column (4) in Table 3, both
time and money donations of risk averse individuals are signiﬁcantly higher than the
average. One possible interpretation could be that those who dislike risk may be more
20favourable to redistribution: indeed, since they typically attach more weight than the
average to chance as a determinant of individual wealth and income, they may also
be more inclined to donate as a form of reciprocity towards those who have been less
lucky.
Summarising, our empirical results seem consistent with a model in which the
amount of charitable activities depends on the individual preferences and decisions
about the allocation of time between diﬀerent alternatives. In particular, in a world
where i) agents are more productive at paid work than when volunteering, and ii) they
may have speciﬁc preferences for time versus money donations (for example, because of
reputational concerns), our results suggest that choices are mainly driven by eﬃciency
considerations, lending support to the baseline model.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have theoretically and empirically developed a behavioural model of
time and money donations, including also labour supply and the time devoted to house-
hold production among the set of individual choices. We propose a general framework
for understanding individual choices, where utility for prosocial behaviours stems from
three sources: “warm-glow”, social esteem, and altruism (i.e. individual propensity to
contribute to the provision of impure public goods).
Results from the empirical model that simultaneously accounts for individual deci-
sions over money donations, volunteering, hours of market work, and hours of domestic
work support comparative static predictions from the theory, and show that money and
time donations correlates positively. Moreover, conﬁrming previous literature, there is a
diﬀerent pattern of correlations across genders, as for the time uses and giving, stressing
the importance of using a behavioural model to fully characterise individual decisions
to donate. In particular, men are more likely to react to changes in the “opportunity
costs” of giving than women. Finally, most of the variables that the literature deems
to be important determinants of individual behaviour turn out to be signiﬁcantly as-
sociated with the decision on whether or not to volunteer. In particular, proxies for
“warm-glow”, social esteem, and altruism signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probabilities of giv-
ing, and underline the importance, suggested by the theory, of taking into account the
impact of reputational concerns in the analysis of individual decision making.
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23Appendix 1: The Model(s)
In this appendix, we discuss a formal derivation of main predictions from the models
presented in Section 3.
The baseline model. We start with the baseline speciﬁcation. Substituting (2)-(5)








,t l,αt v + m,q (αtv + m),G(V + M)
¢
s.t. cm = w(T − tl − th − tv)+y − m
tl = T − (th + tv + tn)
0 ≤ tl + th + tv ≤ T, tl,t h,t v,m≥ 0
(14)
Plugging the budget constraint into the utility function and using the time con-








,T− th − tv − tn,αt v + m,q (αtv + m),G(V + M)
´






∂th ≤ Utl (15a)
[tn]: Ucw ≤ Utl (15b)
[tv]: α(Ud + Uq + UG) ≤ Utl (15c)
[m]: Ud + Uq + UG ≤ Uc (15d)
where Uk, which indicates marginal utility of k = c,tl,d,q,G, is a function of all the
variables aﬀecting utility levels. Equality conditions hold whenever the corresponding
variable is strictly positive at the optimum. However, non-negativity constraints may
be binding for some individuals leading to corner solutions.
Proposition 1 Whenever α<woptimal hours volunteered cannot be positive, while
money donations can be either zero or positive. When α = w both time and money
donations can be positive. In this case, the contributor is indiﬀerent between the two
forms of giving, since what matters for her utility is the total value of donations d =
(v + m).
Proof. Suppose α<wﬁrst. Denoting the marginal utility of donations as A =
Ud + Uq + UG, suppose ﬁrst that (15d) holds with inequality: A<U c.T h u s , t h e
marginal utility of money donations is lower than that of goods and services, so that
m =0 .B u t t h e n wA < wUc and also αA < wUc. Using (15b) this means that, no
matter what the agent decides about working in the market or not (either Ucw = Utl
or Ucw<U tl), it is always true that αA < Utl. But then, by the (15c), the optimal
supply of voluntary work is zero. The opposite cannot be true: suppose that αA = Utl.
(i.e. tv > 0). Then, wA > Utl, which contradicts the condition for m =0 . Assume
now m>0,s ot h a twA = wUc. But then, αA < wUc ≤ Utl, which means that hours
24volunteered will be always zero. Notice that it can also be that money donations are
positive and hours of paid work are zero.
Let’s now consider the α = w case. Now the combination (m>0;tv > 0)c a n
be optimal: in fact, suppose tv > 0, αA = wa = Utl. Then, the chain of inequalities
linking FOCs for time and money donations (through paid work) takes the following
form: wA ≤ wUc ≤ Utl = wA. It is immediate to show that: donations cannot be zero
(wA < wUc); agents would not donate hours without working in the market. In other
words, interior solutions require α = w: however, since (15c) and (15d) collapse into a
single expression, FOCs only deﬁne the optimal total value of gifts d =( m+αlv), but
not its two components separately. Thus, the two forms of giving are perfect substitutes
at the optimum from the individual’s perspective.
Proposition 2 People do not work in the market but work at home only if they are
more eﬃcient in the latter than in the former activity.
Proof. Using (15a) and (15b), we have that Uc
∂f(th)
∂th ≤ Utl and Ucw ≤ Utl. Suppose
∂f(th)
∂th <w : then whenever Ucw = Utl (tn > 0) it must be that Uc
∂f(th)
∂th <U tl (th =0 ),
and viceversa. If
∂f(th)
∂th = w,t h e ntn > 0 and th > 0.
To fully characterise optimal allocations we need to account for strategic interactions
in the provision of the impure public good. As in any Nash-type game, in deciding her
best strategy, individuals take the actions of other community members as exogenously
given. Thus, FOCs result in Marshallian demand (supply) functions for the three
diﬀerent uses of time and for money donations, all of them depending on the value of




i (αi,w i,y i,G −i) ≥ 0,j = n,h,v; m∗
i =
m∗
i (αi,w i,y i) ≥ 0.
As shown by Bergstrom et al. (1986) and, more recently, Andreoni (1990) and
Duncan (1999), a (maybe not unique) Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for this class
of games exists under fairly general conditions, that here are assumed to hold24.I no u r
case, a Nash equilibrium is an allocation of private consumption of goods, paid hours of
work, domestic work, volunteer labour and money gifts such that, given the donations
of others, every person is donating her optimal amounts.
The extended model. The extended model possess a more complex structure of









,t l,v,m,q(v,m),G(V + M)
´
while, of course, time and budget constraints are the same as in the baseline model. In
this case, conditions for an optimum take the following form








∂th ≤ Utl (16a)









[m]: Um + Uq
∂q
∂m
+ UG ≤ Uc (16d)
We now use these conditions to prove the proposition below:
Proposition 3 Suppose that α<w . Suppose further that Uv >U m and ∂q/∂v =
∂q/∂m.T h e n lv > 0 can be an optimal behaviour whenever the value of the utility
gain from “warm-glow” volunteering more than compensate its opportunity cost in the
production of public good and social esteem. Suppose now that Uv = Um and ∂q/∂v >
∂q/∂m.T h e n ,lv > 0 whenever the more eﬃcient production of reputation more than
compensate the eﬃciency loss of using volunteering instead of money gifts to produce
t h ep u b l i cg o o da n dt oc o n t r i b u t et o“ w a r m - g l o w ”u t i l i t y .
Proof. Assume Uv >U m ﬁrst. Deﬁne C = Uq + UG. Suppose lv > 0,t h e n
combining the last three FOCs we obtain: wUm + wC ≤ wUc ≤ Utl = αUv + αC and,
therefore, αUv − wUm ≥ (w − α)C>0. The RHS is the value of the marginal utility
gain, which must oﬀs e tt h ev a l u eo ft h el o s ss u ﬀered in the components of utility others
than “warm-glow”. A similar line of reasoning can be used for (ii) ∂q/∂v > ∂q/∂m.








Uq ≥ (w −α)D>0,w h e r eD = Um +UG,
which proves the result.
26Appendix 2: The Likelihood function
In order to derive the likelihood function of this model it is useful to deﬁne the
following set of indices:
kv =2 Dv − 1; km =2 Dm − 1
kj =2 I(Hj > 0) − 1; j = n,h
where Dv
i and Dm
i are observed binary indicators for volunteering and money dona-
tions respectively: and where Hn
i and Hh
i are paid and housework hours. For individu-
als on a corner solution in both work time and domestic time supply, the contribution
to the likelihood function are as follows:
L1 = Φ4(Ξ;Σ)
where Φp denotes the cumulative density function (c.d.f.) of the multivariate normal
distribution of dimension p, Ξ is a vector of upper integration points with typical
element kjx0
jβj,j = v,m,n,h; Σ = KΩK, and K is a diagonal matrix with non-zero
elements equal to the k indices deﬁned above.
When only the optimal hours of work (process Hn) are positive, we observe their op-
timal amount in the data. We can therefore condition the probability for the remaining
three outcomes on the observed hours of work, and thence write the joint probability as
the product of the conditional probability and the unconditional probability of the con-
ditioning variable: Pr(Dm,Dv,Hh,Hn)=P r ( Dm,Dv,Hh|Hn) × Pr(Hn). Likelihood
contributions take the following form:
L2 = Φ3(Ξ_Hn;Σ_Hn)φ(εn)
where φ(·) denotes the density function of the univariate normal distribution, a _Hn
suﬃx indicates conditioning on hours of work, and the arguments of the multivariate
normal CDF are derived from the moments of the conditional multivariate normal
distribution. Likelihood contributions for the case in which only hours of domestic
work are positive (L3) take an analogous form.
Finally, when the optimal hours of both market and domestic work are posi-
tive, the sequential conditioning can be expressed as follows: Pr(Dm,Dv,Hh,Hn)=
Pr(Dm,Dv|Hh,Hn) ×Pr(Hh|Hn) ×Pr(Hn). Resulting likelihood contributions are of
the form:
L4 = Φ2(Ξ_HhHn;Σ_HhHn)φ(εh|εn)φ(εn)
Given a sample of size N indexed by i, and deﬁned ji = I(kji > 0),j= n,h; the
log-likelihood of the model is:
P
i[nihi logL1i +( 1− ni)hi logL2i +( 1− hi)ni logL3i +( 1− n1)(1 − hi)logL4i] (17)
Note that our model is analogous to Seemingly Unrelated Regression except we use
a nonlinear estimation technique to account for lower limit constraints and partial
observability. The computational burden posed by evaluation of multivariate normal
integrals is tackled by means of simulation-based estimation.
27Appendix 3: Variables’ description and estimation results 
 
Appendix Table A.1: Variables description and summary statistics 
Variable description  Means 
 Women  Men 
Volunteer 0.099  0.129 
Money donor   0.193  0.217 
Log(weekly hours of paid work)  1.862  3.124 
Log(weekly hours of domestic work)  3.251  1.162 
Age 41.142  44.362 
Children (base= no children):     
has 1 child  0.090  0.115 
has 2 children  0.167  0.217 
has 3 children  0.061  0.079 
has 4 children or more  0.018  0.024 
has partner  0.836  0.842 
has partner * partner employed  0.716  0.399 
Max schooling degree  (base=no/elementary education):     
has BA  0.088  0.100 
has high school  0.312  0.290 
has junior high school  0.079  0.067 
has lower degree  0.343  0.369 
Lives in: (base=inner city):     
outer city  0.129  0.128 
town with size<2000  0.057  0.064 
town with 2.001 <size< 10.000  0.246  0.251 
town with 10.001 <size<50.000  0.256  0.248 
town with size >50.000  0.160  0.157 
not employed  0.472  0.152 
Region (base=North west):     
North east  0.186  0.190 
Centre 0.194  0.189 
South 0.234  0.229 
Islands 0.115  0.115 
Commuting costs:     
Commuting time variable  0.032  0.129 
Commuting time missing  0.495  0.182 
Commuting time (minutes)  9.249  15.345 
Economic situation (base=situation worst):     
Economic situat. as last year  0.617  0.627 
Economic situat. better last year  0.133  0.135 
Economic resources adequate  0.709  0.728 
Number of basic goods of difficult purchasing (base= no 
goods): 
  
1 basic good diffic. purchase  0.070  0.064 
2 basic goods diffic. purchase  0.045  0.042 
3 basic goods diffic. purchase  0.035  0.028 
4 basic goods diffic. purchase  0.017  0.015 
Preferences and social attitudes:     
Health insurance  0.168  0.283 
Life insurance  0.262  0.357 
Perceives bad health  0.043  0.042 
Has not friends  0.134  0.110 
Does not go to church  0.097  0.171 
N. observations  11,038  11,331 Appendix Table A.2: Results for a Two probit — two tobit simultaneous model: Simulated maximum likelihood estimates 
 
  Women Men 
  Eq. 1: probit  Eq. 2: probit  Eq. 3: tobit   Eq. 4: tobit  Eq. 1: probit  Eq. 2: probit  Eq. 3: tobit  Eq. 4: tobit 




domestic volunteer  money  donor
hours paid 
work hours  domestic 
 Coef. z  Coef. z  Coef. z Coef. z  Coef. z Coef. z  Coef. z  Coef. z  
Age 0.003  0.1  0.067  2.79  0.072 2.33  0.057  5.82  0.028 1.32  0.044 2.31  0.089  6.67  0.036  1.4 
Age squared  0.000  0.58 -0.001 -2.37  -0.001 -2.47  -0.001  -5.64  0.000 -1.15  0.000 -1.67 -0.001 -7.9  0.000  -1.19 
has 1 child  -0.072  -0.87 0.310  4.25  0.135 1.46  0.031  0.96  0.093 1.32  0.021 0.33  -0.017 -0.39 0.072  0.84 
has  2  children  -0.089  -1.19 0.103  1.56 0.109 1.25 0.118 4.3  0.172 2.84 -0.011 -0.2 0.114 2.9  -0.060 -0.79 
has 3 children  -0.158  -1.55 -0.081 -0.92  0.149 1.37  0.145  4.36  0.190 2.4  -0.041 -0.56 0.092  1.8  -0.278  -2.41 
has 4 children or more  -0.072  -0.42 -0.115 -0.73  0.308 1.54  0.093  1.57  0.160 1.2  -0.122 -0.98 0.389  4.11  -0.112  -0.52 
has partner  0.007  0.09 -0.134 -1.92  0.032 0.32  0.278  9.64  0.023 0.4  -0.004 -0.08 -0.079 -2.16 -0.435  -6.8 
has partner * partner employed  -0.127  -1.89 0.007  0.12  -0.130 -1.71  0.057  2.58  0.036 0.89  0.158 4.41  0.081  3.31  0.180  3.65 
has  BA  0.861 9.79 0.899 11.76 0.008 0.08 -0.192  -5.61  0.850 10.86 0.794 11.83 0.126 2.55  0.005  0.05 
has high school  0.585  7.99 0.663  10.78  0.033 0.44  -0.055  -2.38  0.596 9.22  0.562 10.33 0.028  0.72  -0.004  -0.04 
has junior high school  0.416  4.55 0.434  5.6  -0.067 -0.59  0.003  0.09  0.504 6.24  0.364 5.05  -0.065 -1.31 0.197  2.03 
has lower degree  0.195  2.75 0.170  2.84  -0.032 -0.47  0.001  0.03  0.284 4.59  0.195 3.76  -0.016 -0.44 0.024  0.3 
outer city  0.164  3.02 0.069  1.45  0.099 1.6  0.060  2.86  0.189 3.73  0.116 2.52  0.058  1.86  -0.047  -0.87 
town with size<2000  -0.164  -2.75 -0.123 -2.43  0.026 0.41  0.033  1.45  -0.116 -2.05  -0.004 -0.09 -0.034 -1  -0.042  -0.69 
town with 2.001 <size< 10.000  -0.443  -6.98 -0.459 -8.5  -0.140 -2.04  0.130  6.04  -0.414 -7.15  -0.324 -6.45 -0.092 -2.65 -0.137  -1.96 
town with 10.001 <size<50.000  -0.297  -3.93 -0.453 -7.18  -0.364 -3.84  0.091  3.29  -0.228 -3.32  -0.212 -3.52 -0.138 -3.22 -0.196  -2.19 
town with size >50.000  0.285  3.28 0.241  3.39  0.100 1.23  0.106  3.58  0.252 2.88  0.249 3.62  0.033  0.7  -0.014  -0.17 
North east  0.399  4.04 0.242  2.84  0.099 0.95  0.093  2.66  0.752 8.3  0.347 4.32  -0.082 -1.59 -0.012  -0.11 
Centre 0.454  6.03 0.295  4.82  0.198 2.64  0.122  4.76  0.615 8.23  0.411 6.88  0.020  0.52  0.002  0.02 
South 0.199  2.62 0.215  3.51  0.025 0.33  0.079  3.1  0.428 5.68  0.285 4.79  -0.031 -0.79 -0.002  -0.02 
Islands 0.198  2.43 0.064  0.94  -0.070 -0.84  0.039  1.39  0.189 2.31  0.123 1.91  -0.081 -2.03 0.088  1.17 
Commuting time variable  -0.092  -0.79 -0.095 -0.96  -0.073 -0.69  -0.011  -0.25  -0.216 -3.2  -0.224 -3.99 -0.078 -2.78 -0.066  -0.99 
Commuting time missing  -0.018  -0.32 -0.176 -3.64  -4.321 -96.68 0.491  23.11 0.058 0.94  -0.114 -2.08 -2.903 -43.76 -1.281  -14.04 
Commuting time (minutes)  -0.005  -2.85 -0.002 -1.24  -0.001 -0.63  -0.001  -1.54  -0.003 -2.04  -0.002 -1.54 -0.002 -3.22 -0.002  -1.68 
Economic situat. as last year  0.071  1.32 -0.014 -0.3  0.014 0.28  -0.100  -5.53  -0.065 -1.32  -0.086 -2.03 0.023  0.76  -0.019  -0.33 
Economic situat. better last year  0.111  1.54 0.037  0.61  0.181 2.7  -0.140  -5.5  -0.057 -0.85  -0.026 -0.45 0.082  2.1  -0.038  -0.56 






Appendix Table A.2: - Continued - 
 
1 basic good diffic. purchase  0.080  0.94 -0.005 -0.07  -0.171 -2.31 -0.015  -0.54  -0.015 -0.18  0.017  0.24  -0.015 -0.28 0.046  0.45 
2 basic goods diffic. purchase  0.086  0.82 -0.018 -0.19  -0.029 -0.24 -0.023  -0.65  -0.125 -1.18  0.060  0.67  -0.048 -0.61 0.127  0.98 
3 basic goods diffic. purchase  0.151  1.12 0.043  0.36  -0.081 -0.52 -0.050  -1.25  -0.084 -0.6  -0.262 -2.18 -0.178 -2.37 -0.135  -0.72 
4 basic goods diffic. purchase  -0.121  -0.56 -0.405 -1.92  -0.726 -2.27 -0.172  -2.52  0.012 0.07  -0.268 -1.38 -0.400 -3.13 -0.237  -1.01 
Health  insurance  0.182 3.65 0.203 4.58  0.087 1.34 -0.024  -1.18 0.134 3.25 0.161  4.35  0.128  5  -0.029  -0.66 
Life  insurance  0.123 2.76 0.238 6.09  0.004 0.08 -0.037 -2.1  0.088 2.16 0.227  6.41  0.079  3.23 -0.046  -1.07 
Perceives bad health  -0.004  -0.04 0.071  0.84  -0.018 -0.19 -0.033  -0.89  -0.130 -1.25  -0.038 -0.43 -0.218 -3.14 -0.172  -1.34 
Has not friends  -0.343  -5.32 -0.122 -2.35  -0.072 -1.11 0.068  3.21  -0.382 -5.7  -0.195 -3.61 0.039  1.05  -0.064  -0.86 
Does not go to church  -0.193  -2.82 -0.152 -2.65  0.051 0.77 -0.107  -4.06  -0.188 -3.66  -0.110 -2.5  -0.028 -0.99 -0.041  -0.77 
Constant -2.272  -4.17 -2.823 -5.96  1.956 3.27 1.722  8.88  -2.630 -5.6  -2.625 -6.36 1.789  6.23  1.477  2.84 
                         
Cov(εt,εm)  0.523  25.02          0.556 30.28           
Cov(εtn,εtv)  -0.009  -0.75          -0.039 -2.14           
Cov(εth,εtv)  0.017  1.42          0.041 1.48           
Cov(εtn,εm)  -0.050  -0.97          -0.007 -0.35           
Cov(εth,εm)  0.012  0.7           0.328 4.89           
Cov(εtn,εth)  -0.096  -9.67          -0.671 -15.75          
Var(εtn)  1.511  21.74          1.095 23.25           
Var(εth)  0.419  35.61          10.710 31.82           
                         
Test of model separability into 
giving decisions and other time 
uses (§) 
chi2(4) = 3.72 
           Prob > chi2 = 0.4455 
chi2(4) = 36.02 
           Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
                         
Log pseudolik  -45,15  -61,02 
Number obser.  11,038  11,331 
Wald chi2(36)  434.2  574.89 
Note: the 4-equation model is estimated simultaneously by maximum simulated likelihood, using a GHK simulator with 20 Halton draws. Excluded 
categories are: has no children, no or primary education, lives in inner city, north-west, economic situation worst than 1 year before, one out of five 
subsistence goods of difficult purchasing. 
§: H0 is Cov(εtn,εtv) = Cov(εth,εtv) = Cov(εtn,εm) = Cov(εth,εm) = 0 CESifo Working Paper Series 
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